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SYMPOSIUM
INTRODUCTION
FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS: TOWARD A CHILD
CENTERED FAMILY LAW JURISPRUDENCE
Modern family law has undergone a revolution. Lenore
Weitzman heralded its initial stages in her examination of
the fall of fault-based divorce.' The Supreme Court ushered
in the second stage when it dismantled the distinctions
between marital and non-marital children.2 The third stage
involves rebuilding family obligation on the basis of the ties
that remain: those between parents and their children.
The Family and Juvenile Law Section of the Association
of American Law Schools devoted its 1999 annual program to
the exploration of a child-centered family law jurisprudence.
The program focused on two initial questions:
1. Are children's interests better served by securing the
involvement of both parents or by support for their
primary caretaker?
2. Are children's interests better served by state
intervention designed to vindicate children's rights
independently of their parents or by state support for the
family unit?
Karen Czapanskiy and John Gregory were invited to address
the first issue; James Dwyer and Peggy Cooper Davis the
second issue.
The program then included Greer Litton Fox's "Report
from the Social Sciences" and a panel discussion that I
1. LENORE WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REvOLUTION (1985).
2. See Janet L. Dolgin, Just a Gene: Judicial Assumptions about
Parenthood, 40 UCLA L. REV. 637 (1993).
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moderated with Cynthia Price Cohen, David Chambers,
Martha Fineman, Marty Guggenheim, Fran Olsen, and
Suellyn Scarnecchia, which explored national and
international perspectives on children's rights and interests.
Karen Syma Czapanskiy, John DeWitt Gregory, James
Dwyer and Greer Litton Fox accepted our invitation to
present the papers they prepared for the program in this
symposium. Karen Czapanskiy's article, Interdependencies,
Families and Children,' argues that recognition of
interdependency is necessary to give content to the child's
best interests standard that governs modern custody
adjudications. She maintains that children are necessarily
dependent on their caregivers, and that the law promotes
children's interests when it supports those who have assumed
responsibility for their care. When parental interests conflict,
Czapanskiy would give priority to caregiving; supporting the
continued involvement of both parents when it strengthens,
but not when it undermines, the quality of care.
John DeWitt Gregory's response, Interdependency
Theory-Old Sausage in a New Casing: A Response to
Professor Czapanskiy,4 questions Czapanksiy's conclusions.
First, Gregory maintains that a case by case determination of
caregiving relationships would be just as indeterminate in
practice as the best interest test that it would replace.
Second, he objects that interdependency theory ignores the
conventional wisdom that a continuing relationship with both
parents is important to children's well-being.
James Dwyer's paper, Children's Interests in a Family
Context: A Cautionary Note,"5 agrees that children's interests
must necessarily be determined in the context of the web of
existing family relationships, but then goes on to examine the
ways in which family court decision-making systematically
privileges parents' perspectives over those of their children.
Dwyer notes, in particular, that the judges often identify with
the adults, overemphasize parental "deservedness" at the
3. Karen Czapanskiy, Interdepencies, Families, and Children, 39 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 957 (1999).
4. John DeWitt Gregory, Interdependency Theory-Old Sausage in a New
Casing: A Response to Professor Czapanskiy, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1037
(1999).
5. James G. Dwyer, Children's Interests in a Family Context: A Cautionary
Note, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1053 (1999).
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expense of children's needs, and recognize rights
overwhelmingly on behalf of parents. Dwyer proposes greater
judicial willingness to recognize that there are some cases,
especially in the newborn context, where the child may be
better off without a relationship with a biological parent,
more sensitive case specific decision-making rather than
reliance on bright line rules, and a greater ability to identify
parental interests with the provision of counseling, parenting
classes, and other forms of state intervention rather than
with autonomy alone.
Greer Fox, in Children's Well-Being: Clues and Caveats
from Social Research,6 presents an overview of family
research from the perspective of the social sciences. Much of
the current discussion of children's well-being proceeds from a
set of questions lawyers look to social scientists to answer: are
children always better off with two parents rather than one?
What is the role of conflict in children's well-being? How
harmful is divorce to children's life chances? Are some
parenting styles, whether parents parent together or apart,
more successful than others? How advisable is joint custody,
and are some forms more advisable than others? Greer
cautions us to beware of those claiming definitive answers to
these questions, that the most rigorous studies are likely to
be those with the greatest qualifications. In the process, she
reviews the different measures of children's well-being, the
changing context of family life-the increasing absence of
fathers, reliance on multi-generational families, growing
income inequality, and greater ethnic diversity-and
concludes that a child-centered social policy must make
families central to the process.
Finally, in the last paper, The Missing Piece of the
Custody Puzzle: Creating a New Model of Parental
Partnership,7 I present an overview of the changes that have
redefined family ties. I argue that where family once
depended on the relationship between the adults, with fault
providing the framework for divorce, and clear distinctions
drawn between marital and non-marital relationships, that
the new family law regime ties family rights and
6. Greer Litton Fox, Children's Well-Being: Clues and Caveats from Social
Research, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1075 (1999).
7. June Carbone, The Missing Piece of the Custody Puzzle: Creating a New
Model of Parental Partnership, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1091 (1999).
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responsibilities to parenthood. I further maintain that, while
the shift is now largely complete, the missing piece of the
puzzle is a parental partnership ideal. Particularly in the
custody context, the law can effectively recognize both
parents' ties to a child, where the two are in conflict, only if it
also develops a partnership model capable of identifying those
parents who fail to qualify. I examine the recent custody
cases involving both divorce and unmarried parents to show,
first, the shift that has occurred, second, the growing body of
social science literature that ties child's well-being to a
cooperative model of parental support, and, finally, the ways
in which resolution of the "hard" cases involving adoption and
moves needs to be tied to an understanding of the parents'
relationship with each other. The result is not a reinvention
of the "unitary family,"8 but rather a new definition of
parenthood capable of embracing parenting apart.
Professor June Carbone
Professor of Law
Santa Clara University School of Law
8. See Dolgin, supra note 2.
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